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ABSTRACT: The paper discusses and criticizes views on various aspects of the situ-
ations of animals within human societies offered by authors presenting at the sem-
inar held at the Research Centre for Public Policy and Regulatory Governance. They 
include legal, ethical as well as socio-psychological problems about animal welfare 
and the attempts to improve the conditions in which animals are treated. The author 
hints at the theoretical background as well as implications of some of the ideas that 
are advocated in the ongoing legal and ethical debates over animal welfare. The dis-
cussion aims to shed some light on how the cross-disciplinary studies and exchanges 
that include biologists, psychologists, sociologists as well as legal researchers may 
contribute to numerous controversies in the contemporary animal law scholarship. 
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The domain of animal studies remains a thoroughly interdisciplinary project, link-
ing natural scientists with philosophers, sociologists, lawyers and specialists in many 
other fields. It is crucial, therefore, that the discussion of animal issues take place 
across traditional boundaries of research disciplines. The seminar on animal law in 
the context of ethical, social and constitutional consideration of the protection of 
animals, held on May 2 2019 at the University of Silesia in Katowice, is an excellent 
example of such a cross-disciplinary event. It was convened by the Research Center 
for Public Policy and Regulatory Governance, which was established at the University 
of Silesia in 2018 to deal with all kinds of public and legal policy involving the need 
to solve regulatory problems. One of the main focuses of the research pursued at the 
Center is the legal policy on animal protection with particular attention to reforms of 
the legal status of animals. The seminar was part of that strand of the Center’s activ-
ities, and its central objective was to prompt interdisciplinary discussion on various 
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issues surrounding the process of constitutionalization of animal protection around 
the world. The seminar attracted a number of renowned biologists, psychologists, so-
ciologists and lawyers interested in the question of animal protection. 
Plenary speeches were delivered by Diana Fleischman and Andrzej Elzanowski. Di-
ana Fleischman is a rising star of evolutionary psychology and one of the most wide-
ly known advocates of a sentientist approach to animal ethics. Andrzej Elzanowski 
is a renowned biologist currently affiliated with the “Artes Liberales” Faculty of the 
University of Warsaw. Recently Elzanowski has also been elected the chairman of the 
Polish Ethical Society and remains one of the scientific pillars of the Polish animal 
welfare movement.  
Diana Fleischman’s speech was devoted to an evolutionary perspective on under-
standing animal ethics. She argued that modern animal ethics is based on our ability 
to recognize animal sentience, which has developed as a by-product of the human 
practice of hunting and killing animals. Thus, paradoxically enough, our selfish atti-
tude towards animals provided the background without which the compassion for and 
ethical care of animals could not have emerged. 
Nonetheless, according to Fleischman, the evolutionary basis of morality creates 
also some barriers towards the development of a full-fledged animal ethics that would 
be able to govern people’s attitudes toward animals on a wide scale (on that subject 
see also Fleischman 2019). These include lack of reciprocity in human-animal contacts 
and lack of reputational consequences for wrongs done to animals in private (due to 
their inability to communicate these wrongs to other people). She also discussed the 
so-called vote-buy gap. What she meant by that was the empirical finding that many 
more people tend to support bans on animal exploitation than are prepared to refrain 
from taking advantage of such exploitation individually. This gap seems to have im-
portant implications for the further development of animal protection. It may suggest 
that the approach based on individual persuasion to alter habits entailing industrial 
animal exploitation (such as adopting veganism or giving up other kinds of animal 
products) may be even more ineffective in comparison with lobbying to improve legal 
standards of animal treatment than is ordinarily assumed. 
This thought was also buttressed by the argument and data offered in a speech de-
livered at the seminar by Wlodzimierz Gogloza. He compared the modern campaigns 
aiming at changing attitudes toward consuming animal products to the abstention 
movement in the 19th century. Efforts to appeal to peoples’ conscience in order to 
persuade individual citizens to voluntarily give up using the products of slave labour 
largely failed. Slavery could be effectively combated only by political decisions and 
legal bans. Hopes that the effects could also be achieved by means of individual con-
versions prompted by moral argument were futile.
According to Gogłoza, this is an important historical lesson for advocates of the 
cause of animal rights today. It is confluent with the psychological data provided by 
Fleischman. Both the historical and psychological views strongly support the legal 
approach to animal protection that focuses on lobbying lawmakers for changes to the 
law so that cruel forms of animal exploitation shall either be banned or will become 
economically unprofitable due to improved welfare conditions that corporations have 
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to meet. 
Andrzej Elzanowski spoke on another kind of gap, namely the one between raising 
awareness of animal suffering and the “business as usual” reality of the animal prod-
ucts industry. He inquired why the ubiquitous public declarations of compassion and 
care for animals become ever more distant from the brute reality of animal exploita-
tion, which continues to flourish without any real progress being made to alleviate it. 
Seeking an explanation for this gap, Elzanowski argued that it needs elucidation of a 
difference between personal morality and ethics. The development of sound, scien-
tifically informed and rational ethical theories are not accompanied by correspond-
ing changes in popular morality. As the latter remains unaffected, the discrepancy 
between the level of ethical progress and the positive morality governing individual 
behaviour increases.
By personal or positive morality, Elzanowski meant the actual psychological atti-
tudes based on emotions and normative reactions that emerge from individual expe-
rience and internalized ways of conceiving the world shaped by one’s own socializa-
tion process. Morality so conceived is hardly controlled by ethics, that is, reflective 
thinking and argumentation which takes place among a relatively small number of 
people who are capable of post-conventional examination of the dominant patterns 
of behaviour constituting the positive morality of their time. 
That is why scientifically-informed awareness of the complexity of animal con-
sciousness is rarely perceived as having any normative implications. Animals cannot 
reciprocate; that is, they lack the vital capacity that was the evolutionary cornerstone 
to the development of morality among humans. Thus, conventional morality does not 
regard animals as authorized parties to moral relations. As animals in their standard 
relations with people can seek neither revenge nor reward for what is done to them, 
there is no ground on which conventional morality could stand. This argument, one 
may add, is a modern variation and empirical substantiation of the classical explana-
tion of animal subordination offered by David Hume1. 
Similar to Fleischman, it is animals’ general inability to reciprocate that Elzanowski 
identified as one of the main obstacles to extending conventional morality to non-hu-
man species. The other major obstacle he located in the phenomenon described by the 
so-called terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Solomon, Greenberg 2015). This 
may suggest that people perceive animals as inferior, purely biological, creatures be-
cause they need to hold this view in order to cope with their own awareness of mor-
tality. Therefore, juxtaposing animals to people serves the latter to help them believe 
in their own allegedly higher and more meaningful kind of existence. This, in turn, 
underpins conventional morality, making it resistant to the discoveries and scientifi-
cally-informed arguments proposed in ethical discourse. 
1 Hume famously argued that: “Were there a species of creatures, intermingled with men, which, though rational, 
were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and 
could never, upon the highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their resentment; the necessary consequence, 
I think, is, that we should be bound, by the laws of humanity, to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should 
not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them, nor could they possess any right or 
property, exclusive of such arbitrary lords” (Hume 1998:190).
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Thus, to Elzanowski, it is morality, with all its intricacies and psychological and 
evolutionary entanglements, that should be the main target of the legislation. It is not 
enough to base legal claims on sound ethical theories, since the latter may diverge 
radically from the die-hard views of the conventional morality of a given time. The law 
is, however, able to instigate changes in morality as well, but in much more complex 
and subtle ways than just imposing duties that are substantially different from those 
that people find justified in their own moral beliefs. 
 Speeches were also delivered by three eminent American scholars: Steven Wise, 
David Favre and Pamela Frasch.
Steven Wise outlined his litigation strategy, which has been adopted by the Non-Hu-
man Rights Project, the organization he leads. It aims at seeking a single right to be 
judicially declared to pertain to even a single animal. That, according to Wise, would 
make for a breakthrough in judicial thinking about the status, ultimately, of all ani-
mals and bring about a change in the most crucial social justice question in history. 
His American colleague from Michigan State University College of Law, David Favre, 
argued for seeking recognition of some fundamental rights for dogs rather than for 
other mammals. Favre pointed out that the widespread human sentiment of treating 
pets as family members is a much better foundation for a potentially successful legal 
argument than scientific expert evidence and logically compelling reasoning. Treating 
some animals as a particular category of “living property” (the term has been coined 
as a part of the theory of a legal status of animals developed by Favre, 2010) is just a 
small step from actual recognition of rights and interests of individual animals as a 
subject rather than objects of the law. Favre believes that dogs may be the best “gate-
way animals” to try to make that further step to recognizing animals as holders of 
their own individual legal rights. 
The next speaker, Pamela Frasch, Associate Dean of the Animal Law Program at 
the Lewis & Clark University School of Law, discussed the question of animal cruelty 
images in the context of the constitutional protection of free speech. She argued that 
the case for exempting animal cruelty from the scope of constitutionally protected 
free speech under American law is actually convincing. The issue is, however, far from 
being finally resolved and the free speech argument still remains valid under the con-
stitutional regime of the First Amendment. To overcome this, depictions of animal 
cruelty would have to be conclusively deemed a new category of legally unprotected 
expressions (Perdue, Lockwood 2014). Although Frasch has not approached the prob-
lem from the perspective of the constitutionalization of animal protection, it seems 
that the difficulty she has addressed is at least partially an example of the imbalance 
arising from the contrast between constitutional rights of people (in this case – free-
dom of speech) and the lack of constitutional rank for the legal principles governing 
the protection of animal interests. 
The seminar also included a fascinating sociological session. The paper presented 
by Geeta Shyam of Monash University, Adelaide focused on an empirical study of the 
actual attitudes of members of local Australian communities towards the question of 
animals as property. The study suggests that the majority of people intuitively con-
ceive animals as subjects rather than as property (Shyam 2018). Shyam proposes that 
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the results of the research she has carried out can be instrumental in evaluating com-
peting theoretical accounts of animal status in law as well as the viability of many 
arguments concerning legal reform – namely those that are based on what the com-
munity attitudes actually are. Insofar as it is claimed that the law ought to reflect the 
real attitudes of people, an empirical clarification of those attitudes is needed for the 
evidence on which legal policy towards animals should be based. 
The second speech in the sociological section of the seminar was delivered by Han-
na Mamzer from Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. She discussed an experiment 
performed in Poland concerning the perception of pets by children. One of the out-
comes of this study showed that children not only tend to conceive animals as their 
kindred but often place them among the most important members of their families. 
Interestingly, there seems to be some correlation between the material conditions 
in which a child lives and the perception of pets. The better off the family, the more 
critical an animal becomes for the child, and the more often the parents were missing 
from the family depictions produced by the children. This may suggest, according to 
Mamzer, that pets may to some extent, serve as substitutes for human relations when 
parents concentrate on their professional careers. 
The paper presented by Birgitta Wahlberg from Åbo Akademi in Turku dealt with 
the draft amendment to the Finnish Constitution that has been prepared by a team 
of leading animal lawyers in Finland. The draft of a new article of the Constitution is 
based on the idea of the recognition of individual animals as holders of their individu-
al interests and the establishment of a constitutional duty to take those interests into 
account in all decisions that may seriously affect them (Pietrzykowski 2017). Apart 
from thoroughly thought-over general principles, the bill contains a set of detailed 
and carefully drafted rules concerning various issues of the situation of animals.2 Un-
doubtedly, at the moment the Finnish draft amendment must be considered the best 
model of constitutionalizing animal protection that has been proposed anywhere in 
the world. The only part of the draft that may seem questionable is the principle of 
precaution, according to which all animals should be regarded as sentient as long as 
there is sufficient scientific evidence to the contrary. 
 The contribution of Sacha Lucassen concerned analysis of QBA (Quality Be-
havior Assessment) as the preferred method of examining the welfare of individual 
animals. She thoroughly explicated the theoretical basis of the QBA methods – name-
ly the assumption that in the case of sentient creatures, their patterns of behaviour 
ought to be interpreted as expressions of feelings and other subjective states of mind. 
In this way, external behaviour analyzed by a set of scientifically-informed descriptors 
can constitute a reliable window onto animals’ subjective experience.  
The speeches delivered by Tarja Koskela and Amy Wilson pertained to more practi-
cal aspects of the legal protection of animals in Finland and South Africa, respectively. 
Additionally, a guest presentation on animal law in the context of animal activism was 
delivered by Jakub Stencel, representing Otwarte Klatki (Open Cages) – the leading 
Polish animal activist NGO.
2 The draft is available at https://www.elaintenvuoro.fi
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Each presentation was followed by an intense discussion in which various legal, 
ethical and sociological themes interweaved. This indicates that at the present stage 
of development of the animal rights cause in public discourse, these three levels are 
in no small extent inseparable. In particular, any discussion on constitutionalizing 
animal protection or taking any other significant step forward in the laws concerning 
the protection of animals inevitably raises legal as well as ethical and sociological 
questions and concerns. That is why the most fruitful and productive approach to dis-
cussing animal law is to embed it in the interdisciplinary context of philosophical and 
sociological investigation into the domains underpinning the existing or postulated 
content of legal or constitutional rules. This was the reason for holding a seminar, 
the program of which would encompass the constitutional, sociological and ethical 
aspects of animal law. The proceedings and outcomes of all its sessions demonstrate 
that the initial idea was unquestionably well-founded.
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